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  Kulbrintebeskatning i Danmark
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 Ophav:
Gamst-Andersen, Johan Christian1, Forfatter
Birch Sørensen, Peter2, Vejleder
Tilknytninger:
1Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet, Københavns Universitet, København, Danmark, diskurs:7001              
2Økonomisk Institut, Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet, Københavns Universitet, København, Danmark, diskurs:7014              
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Indhold

Ukontrollerede emneord: Ressourcerente Beskatning Nordsø Neutral Kulbrinte
 Abstract: In this master thesis the Danish petroleum tax system is analysed and discussed based on the theory on neutral rent-based resource taxation. The Danish petroleum tax is also compared to that of Norway, Great Britain and the Netherlands.
To examine the Danish petroleum tax the paper starts by prensenting the theory on neutral resource rent taxation, and shows how the optimal level of resource extraction – defined as the level that would prevail in the absence of taxation – is unaffected by taxation when the tax allows appropriate deductions. Such a tax is called neutral, since it does not distort the investment decisions of the firms conducting the resource extraction even at a high tax rate. The reason is that the base of the tax allows deductions of all costs related to the extraction including the cost of borrowed funds and most importantly a normal return on shareholders equity. This way the shareholders are ensured a return which is at least as good as what they can achieve from alternative investments, and therefore has no incentive to abandon the resource extraction even when the resource rent is taxed at a high rate. A model framework is used to show that this is a valid result even in the presence of uncertainty.
To ensure the neutrality of the resource rent tax, it is important that the tax is symmetric. This means that a negative tax must be payed out to firms in case of a negative resource rent. If the government does not wish to pay out negative taxes, firms must instead be allowed to carry losses forward with interest to deduct them in future income, and firms must be guaranteed that the tax value of a negative balance is payed out at the end of production. Boadway og Flatters (1993) calls this kind of taxation Cash Flow Equivalent, due to its emulation of cash flow taxation. Auctions and state participation are other ways to achieve neutral taxation.
The paper also discusses the potential problems related to the introduction of a neutral rent based resource tax. First of all, the shareholder equity has to be well defined and it must be decided which interest rate represents a normal return to equity. It is suggested to use an average of government bonds.
After the review of the theory, the petroleum tax systems of Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom and the Netherlands are presented with the main focus on Denmark. This leads to the discussion of the Danish petroleum tax system in which it is argued that the system is distortionary. The discussion also goes over possible reasons why the North Sea Agreement was not designed to be fully neutral.
There are several reasons why the system is distortionary. First of all the deduction of firms capital costs only includes the cost of borrowed funds, not the normal return of shareholders equity. Ceteris paribus this provides firms with an incentive to finance their investments mainly via borrowed funds, due to the opportunity cost of equity finance. Instead firms can make use of an extra investment-based deduction, which is shown to overcompensate for the lack of the deduction for the normal return on equity. This provides firms with an incentive to invest more than what is socially optimal.
Another reason why the system is not neutral is its lack of symmetry. Losses are allowed to be caried forward but without interest, diminishing the value. Moreover no payout of the tax value of a negative balance is made at the end of production, leaving firms alone with the risk related to the extraction. This is especially harmful for new firms entering the market, since they do not have any existing income where deductions can be made.
In the comparison of the four countries, Norway is shown to have the largest effective tax rate with an average of 74 percent. For Denmark the rate is 65 percent, whereas Dutch and British rates are respectively 50 and 56 percent.
 Abstract: I dette speciale bliver det danske kulbrinteskattesystem analyseret og diskuteret på baggrund af teorien om neutral ressourcerente-beskatning. Den danske kulbrintebeskatning bliver også sammenlignet med den i Norge, Storbritannien og Holland.
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preamble.pdf (Hovedtekst)
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Mime-type / størrelse:
application/pdf / 2MB
Copyright dato:
2014-05-02
Copyright information:
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Basal

Bogmærk denne post: https://diskurs.kb.dk/item/diskurs:59598:1
 Type: Speciale
Alternativ titel: Beskatning og ressourceudvinding i teori og praksis
Alternativ titel: Petroleum Taxation in Denmark
Alternativ titel: Taxation and resource extraction in theory and practice
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Detaljer

Sprog: Danish - dan
 Datoer: 2013-08-02
 Sider: -
 Publiceringsinfo: København : Københavns Universitet
 Indholdsfortegnelse: 1 Indledning 1
1.1 Problemformulering . 2
2 Teori 3
2.1 Optimal ressourceudvinding 3
2.1.1 Samfundsoptimal udvinding 3
2.1.2 Udvinding under fuldkommen konkurrence 5
2.1.3 Udvinding under beskatning 6
2.2 Ressourcerenten . 7
2.3 Inefficient ressourcebeskatning . 10
2.3.1 Royalties . 10
2.4 Neutrale skattetyper 11
2.4.1 Cash flow-beskatning 11
2.4.2 Overskudsbaseret beskatning 13
2.4.3 Auktion . 16
2.4.4 Statsdeltagelse . 17
2.5 Fra teori til praksis . 18
2.5.1 Opgørelse af egenkapitalen . 18
2.5.2 Dobbeltbeskatning . 19
2.5.3 Valg af rente . 20
3 En neutral skattemodel 22
3.1 Modellens antagelser 22
3.2 Selskabets profit . 23
3.3 Selskabets optimale investeringsomfang 26
3.4 Modellen under usikkerhed . 27
4 Kulbrintebeskatning i Danmark 31
4.1 Historik . 31
4.2 Kulbrinteskatteloven af 1982 32
4.3 Kulbrintebeskatningsudvalget af 2001 . 34
4.3.1 Kommissorium . 34
4.3.2 Anbefalinger . 34
4.3.3 Statsdeltagelse . 35
4.3.4 Skattesats 35
4.3.5 Afska↵else af kulbrintefradag og nyt egenkapitalfradrag . 36
4.3.6 Underskudsfremføring . 37
4.3.7 Afska↵else af bruttoskatter og feltafgrænsning 37
4.4 Nordsøaftalen af 2003 37
4.4.1 Nordsøaftalens hovedelementer 38
4.4.2 Lavere kulbrintefradrag og skattesats . 38
4.4.3 Statsdeltagelse . 39
4.4.4 Afska↵else af bruttoskatter og feltafgrænsning 39
4.4.5 Kompensationaftalen 40
4.5 Serviceeftersynet af 2013 41
4.5.1 Kommisorium 41
4.5.2 Hovedkonklusioner . 42
4.5.3 Vurdering af det juridisk grundlag . 43
5 Kulbrintebeskatning i udlandet 45
5.1 Norge 45
5.2 Storbritannien 48
5.3 Holland . 49
6 Diskussion 51
6.1 Afskrivninger og fradrag 51
6.2 Fremføring af underskud 54
6.3 Danmark og udlandet 55
6.4 Nordsøaftalen – en d°arlig aftale? 57
7 Konklusion 60
8 Litteratur 62
A Appendiks 64
A.1 Bilagstabeller 64
A.2 Korrektionsfaktor ved underskudsfremføring .
 Note: -
 Type: Speciale
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