Bankpakker – Teori og Regulering
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Fischer, Jacob Emil1, Forfatter
Keiding, Hans2, Vejleder
1Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet, Københavns Universitet, København, Danmark, diskurs:7001              
2Økonomisk Institut, Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet, Københavns Universitet, København, Danmark, diskurs:7014              
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Ukontrollerede emneord: Bankøkonomi
 Abstract: One of the most important prerequisites of a modern economy is a proper functioning financial sector. The financial sector ensures financing activity in the community by dissemination of money from those who have surplus liquidity and savings to the parts of the corporate sector that need liquidity to generate growth and jobs and private citizeens, who needs to finance consumption and investments. However, the financial activity also contains significant risks that potentially could have severe adverse consequences for the entire economy.
In the summer of 2008 the financial crises seriously affected Denmark and most of the rest of the world, comprising plummeting share prices and various bailouts. The first sign of these extraordinary events came on the 7th of September when the U.S. government took control of the two giant mortgage banks Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. However the action that really shook the international financial markets came on the 15th of September, when the fourth largest U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, which would turn out to be the largest in history. It started a domino effect that sent the world's financial sector into systemic crisis that to this day affects the markets.
The circumstances lead to the emergence of an acute shortage of liquidity in the financial sector. Among the banks that had major liquidity problems was the largest Danish financial group “Danske Bank”, as it were to refinance a U.S. credit facility of more than 100 billion dk., The situation was so critical, that at a time liquidity was secured only from day to day. Several central sources close to the negotiations did subsequently inform the Danish newspaper “Berlingske Tidende” that many politicians were convinced that "if the Danish Bank falls Denmark falls". Many countries like Denmark spanned a safety net under their credit institutions, and a number of countries went straight to re-capitalizing or took over credit institutions wholly or partly to ensure financial stability. This implicit or explicit government guarantee for credit institutions has thus in some countries created an inappropriate link between credit institution’s health and state budgets.
The massive guarantees in the financial sector in each country are not without some risk for each country. In Denmark the sector of credit institutions constitute for example 435% of the Danish gross domestic product. The number indicates the financial sector´s importance to the community economy and why it may be necessary to buy up the sector. However, there are significant disadvantages for financial markets in connection with the provision of guarantees and bailouts. It is therefore important to understand these effects, so that you can find the most appropriate solutions.
In the thesis I will, based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond and Rajan (2002) and Ratnovski (2008), present a theoretical framework from which I will identify the "guidelines" or "learning points" that can be derived from the model’s theoretical universe compared to the situation where it is necessary to "rescue" the banks. In the light of the above theoretical framework the objectives and tools in the Danish banking bailouts have been descript, and to which extent the Danish bank packages "meet" the identified theoretical points made in the theoretical section is discussed. Based on the review of the Danish bank bailouts and a discussion of the learning points from the academic world, I look closely into the present and especially the future regulation of the banking sector.
I found seven theoretical conditions that are relevant to the Danish bailouts. The first factor explains the discrepancy between banks assets and liabilities may create uncertainty among the depositors regarding the bank's liquidity situation, which may result in a bankrun. (The second) Such a situation can be avoided through government deposit insurance. (The Third) Diamond and Rajan’s model is used to illustrate the risk of a perverse incentive structure in the banking sector. As banks in connection with liquidity shock focuses on short-term investment. It shows further (the fourth) that a government bailout which favors banks with long-term investments, may result that banks with short-term investments coming in trouble to the detriment of total welfare. The model goes on to say (the fifth) that if the government tries to save both banks with a bailout, the state will come in difficulties. (The sixth) Ratnovskis model shows that government intervention may cause banks to make ex ante suboptimal liquidity choices because of moral hazard. (The seventh) Ratnovski also shows that the above moral hazard problem associated with an intervention can be reduced by the State by letting it choose the bank with the greatest net value.
The bank bailouts I and II are without a doubt the most interesting to look at in relation to the theory. While the most obvious link between the bailouts and theory, is seen in Diamond and Dybvig model from 1983. This model shows that bankruns effectively are eliminated by using comprehensive deposit insurance; the same kind of elimination can also be seen in regard to bailouts in the real life. Generally the theory operates, in a very simple frame work, in relation to the extremely complicated financial reality, making couplings between them very difficult.
At last some shortcomings of Basel II are examined. These mainly occur in the calculation of the weighted items for credit risk, which has led to underestimation of capital requirements. Basel III attempters to address some of the problems in Basel II. Overall ensuring Basel III a greater accumulation of capital and tougher rules to which balance sheet items in core capital may be included. But Basel III will not overcome some of the fundamental problems that were with Basel II.
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 Type: Speciale
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Sprog: Danish - dan
 Datoer: 2013-05-15
 Sider: -
 Publiceringsinfo: København : Københavns Universitet
 Indholdsfortegnelse: Indholdsfortegnelse . 6
Indledning . 8
Teoretiske overvejelser 10
2.1 Diamond & Dybvig modellen . 11
2.1.1 Modellen 11
2.1.2 Suspendering af konvertibiliteten . 14
2.1.3 Statelig indskudsgaranti. 15
2.1.4 Delkonklusion 16
2.2 Redningspakker og likviditet Diamond & Rajan (2002) . 17
2.2.1 Modellen 18
Eksempel 21
2.2.2 Bankpakke til Type L banker 22
2.2.3 Delkonklusion 23
2.3 Adverse selection Ratnovski 2009 24
2.3.1 Modellen 24
Bankerne 25
Centalbanken 27
2.3.2 Resultat med en bank og ingen centralbank . 29
2.3.3 Resultat med to banker og en centralbank . 30
2.3.4 Regulering 33
Likviditetsbetinget bailout 34
Kapitaliseringsbetinget bailout . 34
2.3.5 Delkonklusion 35
2.4 Diskussion af teorien 36
De danske bankpakker . 42
3.1 Bankpakke I (stabilitetspakken) . 45
3.2 Bankpakke II (Kreditpakken). 46
3.3 Bankpakke III (Afviklingspakken, Exitpakken) 46
Medgiftordningen (en udvidelse af bankpakke III) 47
3.4 Bankpakke IV (Konsolideringspakken) . 47
3.5 Bankpakke V (Udviklingspakken) . 49
3.6 Teoretiske overvejelser i forbindelse med Bankpakkerne . 50
Delkonklusion 51
Regulering af bankerne 52
4.1 Regulering af bankerne 52
4.1.1 Formål med regulering 53
Incitamenter til en begrænset risiko . 53
Forbrugerbeskyttelse 55
Effektivitet . 55
4.1.2 Instrumenter til reduktion af risiko . 56
4.1.3 Instrumenter til dækning af indskud . 59
4.2 Basel-komiteen . 61
4.2.1 Basel I og II . 62
4.2.2 Problemer med Basel II 64
Problemer med Søjle 1 64
Problemer med Søjle 2 og 3 67
4.2.3 Basel III . 68
4.3 Delkonklusion . 70
Konklusion . 70
Litteraturliste 73
 Note: -
 Type: Speciale
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