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  When Politics Defeat Economics
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Ophav

 Ophav:
Holm Pedersen, Sune1, Forfatter
Lassen, David Dreyer 2, Vejleder
Tilknytninger:
1Økonomisk Institut, Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet, Københavns Universitet, København, Danmark, diskurs:7014              
2Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet, Københavns Universitet, København, Danmark, diskurs:7001              
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Indhold

Ukontrollerede emneord: Politisk økonomi, International handel, Afstemningsmodeller, Heckscher-Olin, Stolper-Samuelson
 Abstract: In this master thesis, I study the connection between political economics and international trade by analysing votes from the US Congress on trade policy issues. If most economists agree that free trade is good for the economy, why do politicians still pass protectionist bills restricting trade? Using roll call votes on 27 different trade bills proposed between 1832-1994, I find that political ideology aswell as the factor endowments of constituencies affect the voting pattern of politicians. Also, the thesis finds that the effect of both variables has changed over time, frombeing highly significant in the early part of the period to being insignificant in the later years.
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Bemærkninger:
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Tilgængelighed:
Offentlig
Mime-type / størrelse:
application/pdf / 3MB
Copyright dato:
2012-07-05
Copyright information:
De fulde rettigheder til dette materiale tilhører forfatteren.
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Basal

Bogmærk denne post: https://diskurs.kb.dk/item/diskurs:31417:3
 Type: Speciale
Alternativ titel: An Empirical Analysis of Trade Voting in the US Congress
Alternativ titel: Når Politik Besejrer Økonomi
Alternativ titel: En Empirisk Analyse af Handelsafstemninger i den Amerikanske Kongres
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Detaljer

Sprog: English - eng
 Datoer: 2012-02-08
 Sider: -
 Publiceringsinfo: København : Københavns Universitet
 Indholdsfortegnelse: Abstract i
Preface iv
Acknowledgement v
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation 1
1.2 The subject of the thesis 2
1.3 The structure of the thesis . 3
2 Review of Literature 4
2.1 Theoretical literature on the political economy of trade policy . 4
2.2 Empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy 6
3 Theoretical model 8
3.1 Trade theory . 8
3.1.1 The Ricardian model 9
3.1.2 Heckscher-Olin model . 9
3.1.3 Benefits of protectionism . 10
3.2 Voting models 11
3.2.1 A simple model . 12
3.2.2 Introducing ideology 12
3.2.3 Alesina’s model . 13
3.3 Econometricmodel . 17
3.3.1 The Probitmodel 17
4 Description of American trade policy 20
4.1 The Early Era, 1832-1861 21
4.2 Fromthe CivilWar toWorldWar I 24
4.3 The Interwar Years . 26
4.4 Postwar America 29
4.5 After NAFTA and GATT . 31
4.6 Summary . 31
5 Description of data 32
5.1 Voting data 32
5.1.1 The ideology of political parties . 33
5.2 Trade bills 34
5.2.1 Trade bills included . 34
5.2.2 Coding of trade bills 36
5.3 Factor data 37
5.3.1 Agricultural data 37
5.3.2 Employment data 38
5.3.3 Capital data . 38
5.3.4 Missing data . 39
6 Presentation of the empirical models 40
6.1 Ideology-model . 40
6.2 Factor-model 43
7 Results of estimations 45
7.1 Ideology-model . 46
7.2 Factor-model 48
7.2.1 Senate votes . 49
7.2.2 House votes . 49
7.2.3 Congress as a whole 50
7.3 The two models combined 51
7.4 Overall 54
8 Discussion and possible extensions 56
8.1 Stolper-Samuelson assumptions . 56
8.2 The role of the President and regional dummies 57
8.3 Lobbying . 58
8.4 Party affiliation and ideology . 58
8.5 The importance of “politics”: Was NAFTA really non-partisan? . 59
8.6 Summary . 60
9 Conclusion 61
A Appendix 64
A.1 List of trade bills used . 64
A.2 SAS-code . 68
Bibliography 75
 Note: -
 Type: Speciale
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